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This paper develops a portfolio framework to characterize and analyze the 
impact of price risk faced by sugar beet growers in the Red River Valley and derives 
implications for capital markets.  Other sources of risk incorporated in the analysis 
are yields and production cost.  Results from stochastic simulation analysis reveal that 
sugar beet growers incur significant price and financial risk. The hypothesis that the 
loan rate for sugar truncates the distribution of net returns and protects growers 
against declining beets prices was not validated.   
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Price Variability and Financial Risk for Sugar Beat Growers 
 




Sugar beet growers in the Red River Valley have enjoyed many years of 
exceptional profits.  In the last couple of years, however, the price of sugar has been 
declining and the effects are being felt by both the sugar beet growers and the credit 
institutions that support them.  The price of sugar has been falling since 1996.  In 
1999, the American Crystal Sugar Company announced to their growers that there 
would be a $1 per ton pay cut for their 1998 beets due to poor winter storage 
conditions.  This pegs the average payment per ton at $35 in 1998 compared to 
$43.32 in 1996.  Average payments for the 2000 crop are projected by American 
Crystal to decrease even further (ND & MN FBME, 1999, AgWeek April 10, 2000). 
 Sugar beet growers in the Red River Valley belong to sugar cooperatives and 
receive payment for their sugar beet crop through the cooperative.  Declining beet 
prices may affect growers in two ways.  Growers may lose a portion of their profits 
from lower sales as well as a portion of their patronage refunds from the cooperatives.  
The cooperative on the other hand may only experience economic losses due to 
decreased throughput (Black, Barnett, and Hu, 1999).  The cooperative will maintain 
profit as long as it processes a consistent volume of beets; however, the lower price of 
sugar translates to a lower price paid per ton and lower returns to the sugar beet 
grower.  Decreased profit to sugar beet growers due to a decrease in beet prices 
implies growers may need to make financial adjustments to balance risks in their 
operations.     4
 
Credit institutions are particularly interested in the effects of lower beet prices 
primarily because of increased bankruptcy risk and whether appropriate measures are 
needed to mitigate their risk by increasing servicing costs such as interest rates.  The 
hypothesis that will be tested in this paper is that price risk associated with production 
of sugar beets is an important economic issue from the beet growers and credit 
institutions perspective.  Although considerable research has been done on risk 
exposure and management of cooperatives (Black, Barnett, and Hu, 1999; Zeuli, 
1999; and Sporleder, 1999), very limited consideration and analysis has been given to 
growers.  The risks faced by individual growers are different from those faced by the 
cooperatives especially in the case of sugar beet growers who must contract and sell 
only to the cooperatives and have no alternative markets.   This paper develops a 
framework to analyze financial risk faced by sugar beet growers in the Red River 
Valley of the United States.  The model developed incorporates price uncertainty and 
is used to derive implications for capital markets. 
  
Sources of Price Variability for Sugar Beet  
Although there has been no economic analysis on factors contributing to the 
declining sugar beet prices in the United States, the literature has identified potential 
causes. Variability in beet prices have been attributed to weather conditions, 
government regulations and trade issues, shifts in farm production patterns, narrowing 
profit margins in agricultural production, and internal management of cooperatives. 
Weather conditions play a role in declining prices of sugar beets, especially in the 
Red River Valley.  In 1997 alone, net farm income declined by $290 million in North   5
Dakota due to adverse weather conditions and diseases (Koo et al., 1998).  Typically, 
the Red River Valley is ideal for outside storage of sugar beets due to the cold winter 
climate.  Higher than average temperatures have introduced concerns especially in the 
Red River Valley region, regarding additional sugar losses from sugar beets stored in 
the piles (Haley et al., 1999).  A significant reduction in the quantity and quality of 
sugar beets harvested resulted from adverse weather conditions, disease and other 
factors.  The  decrease in harvested sugar beets increased per unit processing costs, 
decreased sugar production, and had adverse financial consequences (American 
Crystal Sugar, 1997). 
Government regulation also plays a role in the commodity prices received by 
growers.  The Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act (FAIR) of 1996 
removes the link between income support payments and farm prices for many 
commodities.  This is done by providing seven annual fixed but declining production 
flexibility contract payments, where participating producers may receive government 
payments which are independent of farm prices.  Under this act, the raw sugar cane 
loan rate is fixed at $0.18 a pound, and the refined beet sugar loan rate is frozen at the 
1995 crop level of $0.229 per pound (Lord, 1997).  The 1996 FAIR Act made 
dramatic changes to U.S. sugar policy by reducing government intervention, 
increasing risk to farmers, and creating a more market oriented culture in sugar beets.  
This resulted in fewer, but more efficient growers and more competition between 
sugar refiners (Haines, 1998). 
   6
Trade issues in the sugar beet market have been a main focus for the sugar 
industry, and will likely continue to be an issue.  The North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) and the Uruguay Round GATT (UR GATT) agreements have 
had significant effects on the prices of sugar beets due to import quotas.  The NAFTA 
agreement is nearing year seven in 2000.  This means that Mexico may be able to 
increase the sugar exportation to the US from 25,000 metric tons to 250,000 tons 
tariff free in 2000 (American Sugar Alliance).  With a flood of cane sugar being 
placed into the US market and the world market, sugar prices are declining sharply in 
the US. This is a probable reason why beet prices for 2000 are projected by American 
Crystal to be lower in the Red River Valley. Governments of all sugar producing 
countries intervene in their production, consumption and/or trade of sugar, which 
makes sugar one of the most heavily subsidized and distorted markets in the world 
(USDA, 1998). The “world price” for sugar is essentially meaningless, reflecting a 
relatively small residual of highly subsidized sugar.  About 75 percent of the world’s 
sugar production is not traded on the open market which allows for the remaining 25 
percent to be sold below U.S. cost of production on what is commonly called the 
“world sugar market” (American Sugar Alliance).  Due to the nature of the world 
market, sugar is the world’s most volatile commodity market.  In the past two 
decades, world sugar prices have soared above 60 cents per pound and plummeted 
below 3 cents per pound.  Because it is a relatively thinly traded market, small shifts 
in supply or demand can cause huge changes in price (Johnson, 1999). 
   7
In addition to the aforementioned effects of declining prices, the world supply 
must be considered.  Total world sugar trade is projected to increase by 11.7% from 
25.7 to 28.7 million metric tons for 1999-2008 (Koo et. al., 1999).  Except for the 
European Union (EU), Brazil, Mexico, and South Africa, trade of sugar in most 
countries will increase for 1999-2008.  EU exports decrease mainly because of 
reductions in EU subsidies under the World Trade Organization (WTO).  This will 
make EU sugar production less competitive.  India and South Africa are expected to 
decrease their exports of sugar mainly because of increases in domestic consumption.  
Sugar consumption in India and South Africa is expected to increase faster than 
production.
  
 What does the above information mean to sugar beet growers and financial 
institutions lending to growers?  Can growers be affected by declining sugar beet 
prices given the price-risk mitigating role of their cooperatives and a loan rate 
program that in essence serves as a price floor?  These are the fundamental issues 
addressed in this paper.  First, we will evaluate cost and risk sharing between growers 
and their cooperatives.  Finally, an analysis of growers’ financial risks and risk 
balancing factors, and evaluate implications for capital markets.   
Cost and Risk Sharing between Beet Growers and their Cooperatives  
It is important to understand the uniqueness of the sugar beet cooperatives 
compared to other cooperatives before discussing cost and risk sharing between 
growers and cooperatives. There are three closed (or membership is limited to 
growers), new generation cooperatives processing beets in the Red River Valley of 
eastern North Dakota and South-Western Minnesota.  American Crystal has six   8
processing plants.  Min-Dak and Southern Minn have one processing plant each.  The 
cooperatives are the only firms in the region that process sugar beets.  Beet growers 
have no secondary markets other than the coops to sell their beets.  There have been 
costly renovations done by these cooperatives in recent years and with difficult 
economic times it is likely that these costs are been trickled down to its members.   
There are very few studies on cost and risk sharing between new generation 
coops and their members.  Black, Barnett, and Hu (1999), suggest that growers’ 
overall risk exposure extends beyond production risks and includes risks related to 
storing, processing, and marketing or pricing.  They suggested that these risks be 
analyzed from a systems perspective.  Nevertheless, the cooperative is paid a fixed 
amount per unit processed by the growers.  The fixed payment is independent of 
market prices.  So long as there is sufficient volume or throughput, the cooperative 
will continue to operate profitably. The growers are paid the difference of market 
price of processed beets less all expenses and throughput processing and spoilage.  
Therefore, some growers may be in deep financial distress while other 
growers and the cooperative are sound financially.  For example, data from the MN 
and ND FBME publication indicate that net returns for 1999 for the 50
th (mean) , 20
th, 
and 80
th percentile of beet growers in the Red River valley were negative $30.90, 
negative $154.72, and $142 respectively.
2  Since 1996 the bottom 20%  (20
th 
percentile) of sugar beet growers have incurred negative net returns.  Alternatively, 
the financial performance of the beet coops has been good.  Sugar beet coops have 
                                                        
2  The MN and ND FBME publication provide data for about 850 out of about 3000 beet growers in 
the Red River Valley.   9
continuously sold sugar above the loan rate and reported good performance data in 
their annual reports.   
While cooperatives strive to return earnings to members, this can’t be done on 
a transaction by transaction basis.  Rather, cooperatives usually charge market prices 
for supplies and services furnished to members and competitive prices for products 
delivered for further processing and marketing.  Normally, this allows them to 
generate sufficient income to cover costs and meet continuing needs for operating 
capital.  After the fiscal year is over, the cooperative computes its earnings on 
business conducted through the given sugar cooperative structure (USDA, 2000). 
This approach exposes the growers to costs and price variability they incur and 
receive.  
The loan rate program and other government insurance like the Actual 
Production History (APH) have not protected sugar beet growers from price 
variability.  Black and Hu (1999), discussed that farmers are very concerned about the 
risks of storing and processing throughput loss after beets leave their fields.  The 
APH serves as a protection for production risk and indirectly protects the 
cooperatives rather than the growers.  The financial performance and risk borne by 
the growers and the coops are very different.  For example, if market price for refined 
sugar is lower than the loan rate, the coops can default on their loans and sell to the 
government at the loan rate.
3  Some propositions have been made by Zeuli (1999) on 
                                                        
3  The loan rate has consistently been lower than market price, except for the year 2000 when current 
market prices are at about 21 cents per pound and the loan rate for the Red River Valley is 22.73 cents 
per pound.  Although this translate to about $82./ton,  farmers currently receive only $33.44/ton for 
their beets (using a refine sugar rate of 18%, and the average per acre yields of 18 tons).  At the loan 
rate, the coops will receive 1.46 times for overhead as compared to what the growers receive.   Internal 
management decision strategies may have substantial impact on how much returns goes back to the 
growers in the form of retained earnings.     10
how coops can hedge against price risks by using the stock market or develop 
insurance protection plans for their members, but currently, growers bear all the price 
risk.  The issue of whether the loan rate is a break-even rate that protects growers 
from price risk is questionable in the case of sugar beet coops.  The analysis of price 
variability and financial risk in this paper will continue to characterize the risks borne 
by sugar beet growers and derive implications for capital markets.  
 
Model Development 
 An equilibrium portfolio framework that maximizes beet growers expected 
utility is used to analyze business and financial risk under conditions of price 
uncertainty and derive implications for capital markets and risk balancing. The model 
is built on the hypothesis that declining beet prices cause business risk (BR) to 
increase and subsequently total risk (TR), financial risk (FR), and default risk (DR). 
Modeling and Analysis in this paper are adopted for a characteristic sugar beet 
grower in a stochastic simulation framework.    
It is important to first discuss the definitions, measurement, and arguments of 
these risks as a foundation for subsequent analysis.  In theory, BR arises from the 
variability of returns caused by prices or production to the investors’ risky assets.  
Financial risk arises from the composition and terms of financial claims on the assets.   
In this paper we will use the multiplicative approach used by Barry, (1983) to model  
BR and FR.  Following the multiplicative approach, TR is a product of BR and FR.  
TR is given by, the ratio of standard deviation on equity and the expected return on 
equity or the coefficient of variation of equity.   11
 
(1) TR = (BR)(FR) 
 
(2) TR  = se /‘re  
                   = sa Pa /‘[ra Pa – iPd] 
Pa and Pd are the proportions of the grower’s assets and debt in his/her portfolio. The 
interest on debt is i.  The standard deviation on equity and asset are se and sa, and ‘re  
and ‘ra  are the mean returns on equity and assets.  Business risk is defined as a ratio 
of the standard deviation of returns over mean returns or the coefficient of variation 
for returns on risky assets.  The sources of risk in this paper will be price and 
production cost variability. 
 
(3) BR = sa /‘ra 
 
FR is derived by, dividing TR by BR.  It is an indication of the claims on the grower’s 
assets. 
 
 (4) FR = ‘raPa /‘[raPa – iPd] 
 
The expected return on assets is derived from an equilibrium stochastic portfolio 
model where sugar beet growers seek to maximize the expected utility of returns 
under price and cost uncertainty.  The stochastic returns are used to estimate FR, and   12
derive implications for default risk. The model assumes that sugar beet growers have 
the objective to maximize their expected returns on invested wealth.   
 
(5) Max EU(e1) 
 
Where, e1 =  (1 + re)e0 or end-of period wealth, re is the stochastic return on equity, 
and E0 is the beginning period wealth.  A Taylor series approximation of equation 5 is 
used to derive a mean-variance formulation that expresses the risk-return tradeoff by 
l.  The objective function in equation 5 can therefore be expressed as:   
 
(6) Max YCE = E(e1) – (l/2)s
2(e1)  
 
YCE is the desired certainty equivalent from the growers’ investment, l is the degree 
of risk aversion or the relative risk aversion coefficient evaluated at initial wealth, and 
E(e1) and s
2(e1) are expected value and variance respectively of the grower’s end of 
period wealth from sugar beet production.
4   
 
(7) E(e1) =  E[(1 + re)e0] 
 
                                                        
4 Equation 6 is a standard equilibrium formulation adopted from Barry and Robinson (1986).  Tobin 
pointed out that all choices in a portfolio problem consisting of a risky and risk free asset will always 
be mean-variance efficient.  Thus, consistency between EV and EU model is assured in this context.  
Meyers generalized Tobin’s observations by pointing out that the condition is also satisfied when the 
assets satisfy the location parameter consistency conditions.  Since both Meyer’s and Tobin’s 
sufficiency conditions are satisfied, a maximizing certainty equivalent expression can be formulated 
that is consistent with any particular EU maximizing choice (Robinson and Barry, 1986).    13
The return equity (re ) is = ra Pa   - i Pd, which is the return on sugar beet investment 
less the interest paid on debt.  Sugar beet growers have delivery obligations that 
equates the volume of beets growers supply to the coop to the number of shares they 
own.  One share gives the grower the right and obligation to deliver one acre of beets 
or a proportion that varies from year to year.  This is extremely important for two 
reasons: 1) expected returns and variance of beets and stocks should be modeled 
jointly as a portfolio, and 2) inferences and implications of declining beet and stock 
prices should incorporate the fact that lower stock prices make it attractive to buy beet 
stocks and therefore produce sugar beets under conditions of price uncertainty.
5  The 
returns from beet production and stocks is therefore, ra = rbPb+rsPs.  Where rb and rs 
are the stochastic returns on beets and beet stock and Pb and Ps are the proportion of 
assets invested in beet production and beet stocks in the growers portfolio.  The net 
returns from beet production is given by, rb  = PQ– ñ.   Where Q is the yield and P 
and ñ are stochastic price and cost.  Therefore equation 7 can be written as: 
 
E(e1)   =  E[(1 + ((PQ – ñ)Pb+rsPs )Pa   - i Pd))e0] 
 
                        = (1+ ((‘pQ -‘c) Pb +‘rsPs )Pa   - i Pd))e0 
 
(8) s





                                                        
5 There are delivery obligations with owning beet stock.  A grower may rent the stocks, but they must 
deliver proportionately to their stock holdings. 
   14
Where D0 and E0 are initial period debt and equity, s
2
a is the variance of returns, the 
mean price per ton of beets is‘p,‘c is mean cost, and ‘rs is the mean returns on beet 
stocks.  In the analysis we use the distributions of these stochastic variables rather 
than their mean.  The variance is defined as s
2








s + 2crsbssPbPs  
where cr is the correlation between the returns from beet production and stocks, and 
sb  and ss are the standard deviation of returns from beet production and stocks 
respectively. If we substitute equations 7 and 8 into 6 we get equation 9. 
 
(9) Max YCE  = (1+ ((‘pQ -‘c) Pb +‘rsPs )Pa   - i Pd))e0 









s + 2crsbssPbPs) 
  
From equation we can show using comparative statics that  
 
a) dYCE/dp > 0,  
b) dYCE/dc< 0, and 
c) dYCE/drs > 0 , for all production levels and asset holdings.    
As prices and stock values decrease the certainty equivalent of net return 
decreases and vise versa, but the interaction of prices, stock returns and cost may 
yield different results.  The empirical analysis using equation 8 simulates net returns 
from sugar beets under price, stock return, and production cost uncertainty.  
Simulated returns are used to derive FR and implications for capital markets with a 
default risk model that explicitly incorporates price variability will be explored.  
Estimates of FR gives an indication on the claims of the growers assets but do not   15
incorporate other necessary performance data.
6 The default risk model provides a 
bigger picture of growers’ financial risk and addresses the concerns of financial 
institutions of whether sugar beet growers can meet overall financial obligations 
under declining prices.  
 Default risk is a major concern of credit institutions. It provides a more 
explicit financial risk analysis of the growers. Default risk is the amount of risk 
associated with a borrower not making a payment according to the terms of the loan 
or note to the credit institution.  The models frequently used to analyze default risks 
are common linear and multivariate logit and probit models.  Although these models 
provide a good framework to separate high and low risk borrowers, a linear 
discriminant model by Altman (1985) was chosen because prior studies by Turvey 
(1991) show it gave the best prediction accuracy over the logit and probit model.  It 
also has a list of significantly tested variables.
7  The model with explicit 
representation of price risk is given by equation 11. 
 
(10) Z = 3biXi+mi 
 
   = b1X1+b2X2+b3X3+b4X4+b5X5 +b6X6 + b7X7+mi 
                                                        
6  In general growers buy crop insurance to compensate for losses due to low prices and yields.  Price 
analysis that does not incorporate this fact may result to type one or two errors.  Incorporating other 
financial performance data in a linear discriminant model provide a complete picture of financial risks 
faced by beet growers under conditions of price uncertainty. 
7 The standard Altman’s discriminant function is calculated in the following manner: 
Z=1.2X1+1.4X2+3.3X3+0.6X4+1.0X5.  According to Altman’s credit scoring model, any firm with a Z 
score of less than 1.81 should be placed in the high default risk region (Turvey, 1991) based on the 
given set of data for the calculation.  Explicit representation on how to estimate the discriminant 
model, include variables other than those analyzed by Altman, and measure the significance of 
estimated parameters is discussed by Turvey.  
   16
 
Where;   
X1  = Working Capital/Total Assets Ratio,  
X2 = Earned Equity/Total Assets Ratio,  
X3 = Earnings Before Interest and Taxes/Total Assets Ratio, 
X4 = Market value of Equity/Book Value of Long-term Debt Ratio,  
X5 = Sales/Total Assets Ratio,  
X6 = Price,  
X7 = Standard deviation of prices, and 
mi = the error term 
Z is the overall measure of the default risk classification of the borrower being 
analyzed. The larger the value of Z, the lower the chance that the borrower is going to 
default and vice versa.  The proceeding section presents the data used for the analysis 
in this study.  
 
Data 
The Minnesota and North Dakota FBM (1999) publication has historic data 
for average, low, and upper 20% of sugar beet costs, net returns on beets, and prices 
for growers in the Red River Valley. These data, in a stochastic simulation 
framework, are used to estimate the certainty equivalent of net profits for a 
characteristic grower in the Red River Valley. The stochastic simulation framework 
enables us to project net returns for price ranges as low as $30 per ton.  BestFit 
software is used to determine the distribution of price, production costs, and the   17
certainty equivalent of net profits for risk levels ranging from 0 to 0.2.
8  The 
distributions for price, output, production cost, and net returns per acre are Beta(0.95, 
1.2)*16.52+29.09, Beta(1.08, 1.08)* 1.81e+2+5.25e+2, and Normal(16.73, 1.21e+2) 
respectively.  The reason why distributions are used rather than actual numbers is 
because the growers do not know the price, output levels, and production costs at the 
beginning of the season when production decisions are made.  These variables vary 
widely with weather conditions, spoilage, shrinkage, and other logistics factors.  
@Risk is used to simulate net returns and FR for a characteristic farmer. 
Performance data with return on beet stocks for equations 9 and 11 are 
simulated from 30 beet growers. Five years performance data were provided by a 
financial institution for 30 beet growers in the Red River Valley. This data was used 
to simulate 3000 observations for a characteristic farmer for all variables in equation 
11. The sample size of 3,000 observations was also simulated because the 
discriminant model requires large data size to ensure efficiency of estimated 
parameters (Turvey, 1991) and this is the approximate number of sugar beet farmers 
belonging to sugar beet cooperatives in the Red River Valley.  The distribution for 






                                                        
8  The range of the risk premium represents the degree of risk aversion of the farmers with zero 
resenting risk neutrality and higher values representing higher levels of risk aversion.   The range for   18
Table 1: Distribution of Variables from BestFit. 
VARIABLE  DISTRIBUTION 
Z Score   Lognormal(7.67,26.48)+-.17 
Working Capital/TA  Logistic(-7.33e-3,9.01e-2) 
Earned Equity/TA  Logistic(6.67e-4,2.69e-2) 
EBIT/TA  Logistic(2.17e-2,3.00e-2) 
Equity/LL  Lognormal(14.26,92.64)+-.25 
Sales/TA  Chisq(1.00) 
Price  Beta(0.95,1.20)*16.52+29.09 
Std. of  Price  Beta(0.47,0.37)*6.65+ -4.01 
 
To be representative of the 30 farmers in the sample, the 3,000 simulations 
needed to be correlated.  Correlation between variables was estimated for the original 
30 observations and utilized to correlate draws from distributions used for the 
simulation.
9 This procedure is very useful to generate a consistent sample of 3000 
observations.  Equation 11 is then estimated using the 3000 observations.  All data 
were collected and simulated for a characteristic grower.
10 Overall two models were 
estimated. The first model had price and the standard deviation of price and the 
second model had only the significant variable identified by Altman. 
                                                                                                                                                              
the risk premium is adopted from Barry and Robinson. 
9 The correlation matrix of variables was squared to obtain the variance covariance matrix which is 
plugged into the @RISK spreadsheet using the RISKCORRMAT command to correlate the 
distributions from Table 1. 
10 According to the FBM E publication and information from capital markets, a characteristic sugar 
beet grower in the Red River Valley has approximately 59% equity and 41% debt.  Using the 
relationship A/E –L/E = 1, this implies Pa =1.41 and Pd = 0.41.  The average interest on debt is 9% 
and average acreage of sugar beet grown is 179.29 for 1999.   The average family living expense is 
$82,300.      19
 
Results 
Simulated net returns decrease significantly as prices decrease and are 
negative for prices below $33 per ton for a characteristic grower.  Figure 1 and Table 
2 show simulated net returns, BR and FR for different price levels.  These results 
show that a beet price less than $36 per ton could be potentially hazardous to a 
farmer’s ability to generate sufficient profit to cover capital debt, living expenses, and 
other miscellaneous expenses.  The model also showed that the break-even price for a  
Figure 1: Net Profit Ranges and Price Variability 
characteristic grower is approximately $32.4 per ton (A break-even price is one where 
revenue minus expense of production equals zero).  Current payments by the sugar 
cooperative are nearing the break-even point as they have decreased from the past 
payments received.  Price levels lower than $33 per ton serves as an indication for 
sugar beet growers to consider growing alternative crops or engage in equipment 













$30 $31 $32 $33 $34 $35 $36 $37 $38 $39 $40
Minimum Net Profit
Average Net Profit
Maximum Net Profit  20
 
Business and financial risk increase significantly as prices decrease.  These 
results show that as the beet price falls below $32.4 per ton, holding beets in a 
grower’s portfolio becomes very risky.  The coefficient of variation of returns on 
asset or BR is very high (12) and the claims on the firm’s asset or FR estimates are 
very high (11.87) for prices, $33 per ton or less.  It becomes financially infeasible for 
the average grower to produce beets at prices lower than $33 per ton.
11  The simulated 
net returns also indicate that some growers may incur negative net returns even at a 
higher price ton of $40.  The probability of negative returns increases significantly as 
prices decrease.   
Table 2: Net Returns, Business, and Financial Risk with Decreasing Prices 










$30  $-36,675  $-9,675  $17,325  *  * 
$31  $-33,525  $-5,625  $22,275  *  * 
$32  $-30,375  $-1,575  $27,225  *  * 
$33  $-27,225  $2,475  $32,175  12  11.8725 
$34  $-24,075  $6,525  $37,125  4.689655  1.69854 
$35  $-20,925  $10,575  $42,075  2.978723  1.340044 
$36  $-17,775  $14,625  $47,025  2.215385  1.224717 
$37  $-14,625  $18,675  $51,975  1.783133  1.167805 
$38  $-11,475  $22,725  $56,925  1.50495  1.133895 
$39  $-8,325  $26,775  $61,875  1.310924  1.111386 
$40  $-5,175  $30,825  $66,825  1.167883  1.095356 
* Infeasible   21
 
 These results are consistent with FBME data for net returns by sugar beet 
growers in the Red River Valley.  Since 1998, average and low 20% sugar beet 
growers who own or rent land have experienced high variability on their gross and net 
returns and at times incurred negative net returns with price levels below $33 per ton. 
The big question therefore, is why do growers continue to grow beets with potential 
price levels below $32 per ton?  This question has been addressed partly by 
incorporating stock returns and variability of production costs in the simulation 
model.
12  More insight to this question is provided by default risk analysis.  The linear 
discriminant results analyze whether growers may have some intangible incentives to 
sustain or reduce financial risk as prices decrease.
13 Results from the default risk 
analysis incorporate other performance measures not used in portfolio simulation 
model. The results are presented in Table 3.   
 
                                                                                                                                                              
11 The results did not change significantly as the premium for beet increased to about 0.1.  
12  But returns on stocks are currently low and negative for some growers.  There are some cost sharing 
among growers with expensive equipment.  This is a tool used by growers to compensate for low 
prices but needs further investigation and research.    
13 Growers are owners of the coops and will have retained earnings at some point in time.  Other crops 
in the grower’s rotation can sustain low beet prices.  The growers anticipate that conditions may 
change or is the right time to buy beet stocks because prices are low. This will all be captured by the 5 
years panel data used in the discriminant analysis.   22
Table 3: Coefficients and Default Score with and without Price Variability 
Variables  Coefficients of Restricted Model  Coefficients of Unrestricted 
Model 
Intercept  10.901*  10.041* 
Working Capital/TA  0.338  -1.808 
Earned Equity/TA  7.086**  25.955*** 
EBIT/TA  1.525*  8.156** 
Equity/LL  -0.004  0.038 
Sales/TA  -0.038  -0.315 
Price  0.251  0.372* 
Std. of  Price    0.793 
Z Score  2.824  -3.145 
F-Significance  0.006  0.005 
R
2  49.75%  60.53% 
*, ** imply significant at the 10% and 5% level of significance respectively.   The test for significance 
for the discriminant model is done using the F-test (Turvey, 1991).   
The signs of the significant variables are as expected.  Although the two 
models have good fit with very significant F statistics, the unrestricted model with 
price variability has a better fit with a higher R
2.   The R
2 was 60.53% as compared to 
49.75% for the restricted model.  Price becomes significant as we incorporate price 
variability into the discriminant model.  As price decreases the Z score decreases and 
sugar beet growers have a greater probability to default on their loans.  Incorporating 
other performance data did not contradict the fact that declining beet price has 
adverse financial implications for beet growers.   
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Overall, the default risk is low with the restricted model and becomes very 
high as we incorporate price variability into the model.  The Z score for the restricted 
model is below the standard 1.81 recommended by Altman.  What is really interesting 
is the change in Z score from 2.824 to negative 3.145 as price variability is added to 
the model.  Growing sugar with current price uncertainty increases the risk of the 
grower’s portfolio and may result in subsequent loan rejection.   This model shows 
that sugar beet price does affect the probability of default risk.  If the model shows 
high probability of default, a person analyzing the credit would be signaled to take a 
more in depth look at all the factors affecting the particular credit.  With a result of 
low default risk, the analyst may be more at ease with the credit. 
Conclusion 
 Results from the stochastic simulation model showed that $32.4 per ton is the 
break even beet payment for growers in the Red River Valley.  Growers with a 
significant investment in sugar beets may have significant difficulties to cover 
production costs and meet family living expenses when beet prices fall below $36 per 
ton.  Also, growers may have trouble obtaining working capital and other bank loans 
at this price level.  With this information, it can be concluded that both the sugar beet 
growers and the financial institutions landing to growers are experiencing a time of 
great volatility.  Results from all the models indicate sugar beet growers and lending 
institutions should be more proactively involved in strategies that reduce the impact 
of declining beet prices.  These strategies maybe to advise growers to switch to 
alternative crops, engage in equipment sharing and other cost-cutting activities, and 
encourage their cooperative develop price-risk management strategies.    24
 
Implications for Crop Revenue Insurance  
Growers in the Red River valley continue to incur high insurance premiums 
and insurance coverage will be more and more required by financial institutions. 
Coops and growers have to develop price-risk management strategies like hedging or 
some form of price insurance that growers can use to protect themselves against 
declining sugar beet prices.  The loan rate and other farm insurance programs like 
APH provide limited price protection for the growers.  Although there are risks 
associated with belonging to a cooperative, the farmer’s primary incentive for joining 
a cooperative is to shield them from some business and financial risk.  In the case of 
sugar beets, the cooperatives can convert the raw product, sugar beets, and sell into a 
market where prices can be characterized as being more stable whereas the grower 
does not have access to a secondary market with the delivery contract obligation.   
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